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The evolution of Norwegian security policy is a result of the evolving post-
Cold War political order in Europe and the relationship that Norway has vis-a-vis 
its neighbors. A new set of priorities is emerging. With the end of the Cold War 
the factors which influenced the security policies of Norway since World War II 
have changed to include more non-traditional factors. In the past, Norway's 
security concerns were primarily dictated by the military threat from the Soviet 
Union. Now, as the twenty-first century approaches, the former Soviet Union 
does not pose an immediate military threat. However, the Arctic still remains 
strategically important for Norway and NATO. These new priorities emphasize a 
foreign and security policy which stabilizes the region through political and 
economic aspects vice military means. This change however does not delete 
the traditional emphasis on the military aspects. 
Environmental degradation is one aspect of the non-traditional influences 
with which Norway is now concerned. The presence of a decaying Russian 
(former Soviet Union) nuclear submarine fleet coupled with the largest 
concentration of nuclear reactors in the world in the Kola Peninsula region pose 
a threat to Norway. Environmental issues have come to the forefront of 
v 
Norwegian security and foreign policy concerns and in response, Norway has 
become a leader in emphasizing the importance of addressing environmental 
problems internationally. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The evolution of Norwegian security policy is a result of the evolving post-
Cold War political order in Europe and the relationship that Norway has vis-a-vis 
its neighbors. A new set of priorities is emerging. Originally, Norway's leaders 
believed that its isolation could guarantee neutrality. Norway, a small country, 
was thrust into the vortex of the strategic competition of the superpowers as a 
result of World War II and then the Cold War. It has taken Norway time in 
adapting to external constraints. World War II was truly the turning point which 
pushed Norway into an alliance with the Western powers and eventually NATO. 
Norway learned as a result of being defeated by the Nazi's that it could not stand 
alone. Thus, a security policy based on alliance, with self-imposed restraints on 
commitments, became the basis of Norwegian security policy until the end of 
the Cold War. 
As in the past the change in external factors have reoriented the direction 
of Norway's security policy. In the past, Norway's security concerns were 
primarily dictated by the military threat from the Soviet Union. Now, as it looks to 
the twenty-first century, the former Soviet Union does not pose an immediate 
military threat. However, the Arctic still remains strategically important for 
Norway and NATO. The change emphasizes a foreign and security policy which 
stabilizes the region through political and economic aspects vice military means. 
This change however does not delete the traditional emphasis on the military 
aspects. 
Environmental degradation is one security aspect of the non-traditional 
influences with which Norway is now concerned. The presence of a decaying 
Russian (former Soviet Union) nuclear submarine fleet coupled with the largest 
concentration of nuclear reactors in the world in the Kola Peninsula region pose 
a threat to Norway. These environmental issues have come to the forefront of 
Norwegian security and foreign policy concerns as well as Canada, Sweden, 
ix 
Finland, the United States, Iceland, the British Isles and Greenland. Steven 
Greenhouse stated that in the United States Foreign Policy makers "are now 
looking at environmental threats today much in the same manner as they did 
military threats such as new surface-to-air missile sites alarmed policy makers 
several decades ago." 
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, who 
headed the UN World Commission for the Environment and Development, 
Norway has become a leader in emphasizing the importance of addressing 
environmental problems which are legacies of the policies of the former Soviet 
Union and presently a distinct problem for Russia and its neighbors. 
The political, economic and societal changes that encompass Europe present 
the opportunity for stability and peace. Norway has taken this opportunity to 
focus its security policy on issues which until now have been overshadowed by 
the Cold War. 
Norway's security concerns in post-Cold War Europe will continue, in 
part, to focus on Russia and its concentration of military assets on the Kola 
Peninsula. In addition, new security policies focusing on broader issues and not 
solely on preparing to repel a Russian invasion will be evident. For Norway, the 
environmental problems in Russia are so far reaching and affect so many 
countries that competition for attention and commitments from other nations will 
arise. Efforts to tackle the environmental problems and to integrate Russia into 
binding multilateral cooperation with a stable Europe, and to prevent political, 
economic, and social chaos from erupting, will be the primary concern of 
Norway's security agenda. Coordination between the different international and 
bilateral institutions will enhance Norway's position as a Nordic bridge between 
the US, Russia, NATO, and the EU. 
Ecological threats are do not respect political boundaries. While present 
environmental problems are of concern, it is the future threats to the 
environment which is where the emphasis needs to be placed. As the protective 
X 
containers and metal skins of these Russian reactors and barrels begin to 
corrode, they will spew their contents into the ocean. The feasibility of removing 
the reactors has been looked into, however, there is a chance that damage to a 
unit while trying to retrieve it could cause a leak or, worst case, cause a nuclear 
chain reaction. The upgrading and repairs to existing storage facilities must be 
emphasized. Russia continues to generate radioactive waste without the 
storage facilities to accommodate it. A nuclear incident on land can have more 
immediate effects than one in the ocean. 
Once Russia accepts the responsibility for its past actions and makes a 
determined effort to make corrections, then the organizations which have offered 
their assistance, financial and technical, will be able to move forward. Working 
to ease the tensions and possibility of political conflict between Norway and 
Russia and ultimately preventing any future damage to the people of the region 
and the Arctic's fragile environment should be the goal. However, when the 
Russians continue to spend enormous amounts of money on operating a nuclear 
fleet and building new nuclear vessels, and then turn around and say that there 
is no funding available for building storage units and processing facilities, their 
credibility is questioned. There are still remains great strides to be taken in the 
area of environmental security in the northern region and it will ultimately require 
international cooperation to dispose of this threat. 
xi 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The evolution of Norwegian security policy is a result of the evolving post-
Cold War political order in Europe and the relationship that Norway has vis-a-vis 
its neighbors. A new set of priorities is emerging. Originally, Norway's leaders 
believed that its isolation could guarantee neutrality. Norway, a small country, 
was thrust into the vortex of the strategic competition of the superpowers as a 
result of World War II and then the Cold War. It has taken Norway time in 
adapting to external constraints. World War II was truly the turning point which 
pushed Norway into an alliance with the Western powers and eventually NATO. 
Norway learned as a result of being defeated by the Nazi's that it could not stand 
alone. Thus, a security policy based on alliance, with self-imposed restraints on 
commitments, became the basis of Norwegian security policy until the end of 
the Cold War. 
In the wake of the Cold War the factors which had traditionally influenced 
the security policy of Norway have changed to encompass more non-traditional 
influences. Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Johan Holst stated: "Foreign 
policy is no longer simply a question of relations between states. It is also a 
question about interaction between societies. It is also a question about 
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managing common problems. Therefore it is natural that foreign policy becomes 
more democratically rooted, that it reflects wider commitment and a wider 
distribution of responsibility." 1 
As in the past the change in external factors have reoriented the direction 
of Norway's security policy. In the past, Norway's security concerns were 
primarily dictated by the military threat from the Soviet Union. Now, as it looks to 
the twenty-first century, the former Soviet Union does not pose an immediate 
military threat. However, the Arctic still remains strategically important for 
Norway and NATO. The change emphasizes a foreign and security policy which 
stabilizes the region through political and economic aspects vice military means. 
This change however does not delete the traditional emphasis on the military 
aspects. 
Environmental degradation is one security aspect of the non-traditional 
influences with which Norway is now concerned. The presence of a decaying 
Russian (former Soviet Union) nuclear submarine fleet coupled with the largest 
concentration of nuclear reactors in the world in the Kola Peninsula region pose 
a threat to Norway. These environmental issues have come to the forefront of 
Norwegian security and foreign policy concerns as well as Canada, Sweden, 
Finland, the United States, Iceland, the British Isles and Greenland. In the 
1Holst cited in Johan Eriksson, "Security in the Barents Region: 
Interpretations and Implications of the Norwegian Barents Initiative", 
Cooperation and Conflict, val. 30(3) 1995, p. 270. 
2 
United States Foreign Policy makers "are now looking at environmental threats 
today much in the same manner as they did military threats such as new 
surface-to-air missile sites alarmed policy makers several decades ago."2 
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, who headed the 
UN World Commission for the Environment and Development, Norway has 
become a leader in emphasizing the importance of addressing environmental 
problems which are legacies of the policies of the former Soviet Union and 
presently a distinct problem for Russia and its neighbors. 
This thesis will examine the origins and development of Norway's post-
Cold War security policy and environmental factors which will influence future 
issues. This thesis in the process thus will also analyze the development of the 
different phases of Norway's security policy. By way of background, there will be 
an initial overview of the basis of Norway's security policy, following the time 
periods of: 1905 through World War I, the inter-war period and World War II, 
1945-1947. Then will follow the Cold War, and the post-Cold War periods. The 
events in these time periods have influenced the decisions made by Norwegian 
policy makers in the evolution of Norway's security policy as it exists today. 
Finally, issues are discussed that may influence Norway's established security 
policy toward the end of this century and into the next. 
2Steven Greenhouse, "The Greening of American Diplomacy," New York 
Times, October 8, 1995. 
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The next chapter will address the issue of environmental degradation as a 
security and foreign policy issue and why it is important to Norway's security 
needs. It will focus on environmental issues in the Arctic Region, specifically the 
Russian Kola Peninsula region which remains the most heavily fortified region 
world-wide. Attendant to the area are the effects of military and non-military 
sources of pollution which are of immediate concern to Norway and NATO. 
Additionally, this thesis will examine the effects of the assistance 
provided by Euro-Atlantic organizations on the future of Norway's security policy, 
specifically in the environmental area. Emphasis will be placed on Norway's 
relationship with these institutions with reference to Russia. Focus will be 
placed on the following institutions: the European Union (EU), North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS), and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. International 
assistance by the United States to Norway and Russia in the environmental field 
from disarmament related pollution problems will also be reviewed. Finally, this 
thesis will conclude with an analysis of how the situation in the Arctic region may 
have consequences which will have an impact on Europe and the United States 
as a whole. 
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II. NORWAY'S SECURITY POLICY 
A. ORIGINS 
The origins of contemporary Norwegian security policies can be traced 
back to the nineteenth century. Cultural factors have had a decisive impact on 
the development of Norway's foreign and security policies. Although the history 
of Norway as a sovereign country dates back only 1 00 years, there are several 
factors which are present in its security and foreign policies. Traditional factors 
include: 
- predisposition to isolationism and neutrality 
- geographical remoteness 
-reliance on mobilization forces vice a large standing force and military 
assistance from outside 
- desire to remain outside foreign entanglements 
- preference to international arbitration vice military conflict as a means to 
an end 
-reluctance to engage in alliances 
- deterrence and reassurance as a basis of foreign and security policy 
- preoccupation with a common border with a superpower 
New post-Cold War factors may include: 
-non-military issues (environmental) as foreign and security concerns 
- presence of an unstable neighbor (politically and economically) 
5 
The Norwegian predisposition to isolationism and the feeling of 
geographical remoteness from European power politics were the most obvious 
features of its international security policy. It was during the nineteenth century, 
when Norway was in a union with Sweden with the status of an independent 
state, that a constitution was drafted. Formal adoption by the Norwegians 
occurred on 17 May 1814 and established a government with the right to levy 
taxes and national representation. During this period, Sweden was content to 
let the Norwegians control their domestic affairs but retained the right to dictate 
foreign policy for both countries. The Norwegian government had little to no 
authority in foreign affairs and no way of protecting its own interests. One issue 
that attributed to the break-up of the union between the two countries was the 
Norwegian desire to establish a separate consular service to serve Norway's 
interests abroad and its growing merchant fleet. 
The basic elements of Norway's security and foreign policy have roots 
comparable to some of the principles of early American foreign policy. Norway's 
basic foreign policy fundamentals on isolationism and avoiding entanglement in 
European affairs are similar to those which formed the basis of American foreign 
policies in the nineteenth century. It was during the constitutional convention of 
1814 that the quasi independent Norway's founding fathers delivered an 
admonition to their countrymen similar to the one George Washington had 
delivered in his Farewell Address eighteen years earlier in 1796. The country 
6 
was warned against a continuation of links, like those with Denmark, which had 
proved to be "an unnatural liaison with another country which could only involve 
us in unnatural wars and entangle us in disputes with Powers which it was 
neither natural nor necessary for Norway to quarrel with. By avoiding such links 
with other Powers, Norway could keep out of European quarrels."3 No doubt 
these feelings were conceived as far back as the 1600s when Denmark drew 
Norway into wars with Sweden and the Baltic Sea powers. During the 
Napoleonic Wars Denmark again drew Norway into war, on Napoleon's side, 
against Britain. The resulting British blockade and the British market being 
closed to Norwegian timber caused the worst economic depression Norway had 
ever experienced. This was one of the first lessons which helped to formulate 
future Norwegian policies of maintaining friendly relations with Britain. A similar 
philosophy was used in the development of the three cornerstones of 
Norwegian national security policy which were first articulated during the 
constitutional convention: "first, the security of its geographical situation on 
Europe's periphery; second, the security of automatic protection by Britain and 
British sea power; third, a determination not to jeopardize this fortunate position 
through ventures into foreign policy."4 Although Norway had established its own 
301av Riste, "The Historical Determinants of Norwegian Foreign Policy." in 
Johan Jorgen Holst, ed., Norwegian Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Oslo: 
Norwegian University Press, 1985), p.12. 
41bid.,p. 13. 
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identity, it did not have the people, resources, or political power to assert its 
independence by its own means. It was not until the later part of the nineteenth 
century that Norway was able to gain more control of its internal matters and 
separate from its union with Sweden in 1905.5 The initial lack of foreign policy 
experience, domestic concerns, and rapid industrialization contributed to an 
isolationist and neutral foreign policy orientation. 
B. 1905-WORLD WAR I 
During the period from 1905 to World War I, Norway's economy 
prospered. Its policies emphasized its economic interests in foreign trade, 
fishing, and shipping. Additionally, Norway followed the advice of another 
American president, Thomas Jefferson. "Peace, commerce and honest 
friendship with all nations- entangling alliances with none."6 With this idea in 
mind the Norwegians enjoyed economic progress while not becoming entangled 
in the swamp of international politics. 
The Russian presence on the Eastern border was the only source of-
apprehension in this period. This threat was considered minimal since the 
Russian military had been weakened after being defeated by Japan in 1905. 
The Norwegians, however, assumed that Britain, which during the nineteenth 
5 James G. Terry, Factors Affecting the Military Environment of North 
Norway: Its History, International Relations, Physical Characteristics, and 
Balance of Military Forces (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1988), p. 3. 
6Riste, p. 14. 
8 
century had feared the extension of Tsarist Russia over Norwegian territory, 
would never let Russia conquer Norway. With this theory in mind the Norwegian 
elites believed that in the event of hostilities, they could count on Britain as an 
ally. Armed with these two theories, geographical remoteness and security 
provided by Britain's self-interest in preventing Russia from gaining a foothold in 
Norway, foreign entanglements were regarded as unnecessary and dangerous. 7 
One of the first ·foreign policy initiatives by the Norwegians was the 1907 
Treaty of Integrity with four of the great powers of Europe: France, Germany, 
Britain, and Russia. This was a guarantee that Norway would not cede itself or 
any part of its territory to any power. The treaty was also designed to garner 
international guarantees for Norway's neutrality. The Norwegian population 
favored the isolationist idea when it came to foreign policies. But Norway's style 
of isolationism, in fact, did not mean isolation since Norway's economy 
depended heavily on foreign trade and the earnings of its merchant navy.8 
The policy of neutrality was first tested during the First World War when 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark invoked common security policies. However, two 
factors, the impending German defeat and the Norwegian dependence on a 
British-dominated sea, led Norway to adopt a more pro-British attitude and to 
701av Riste, "The Historical Determinants of Norwegian Foreign Policy," in 
Johan Jorgen Holst, ed., Norwegian Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Oslo: 
Norwegian University Press, 1985), p. 13. 
8 lbid. 
9 
become what was referred to as a "neutral ally."9 The war in Europe never 
threatened the integrity of Norwegian territory. However, German U-boat actions 
during the war inflicted heavy damage on Norwegian merchant shipping. As a 
maritime nation, Norway, was dependent on its shipping and trade to sustain its 
economy. The allied blockades and the German submarine warfare placed 
Norway in a fragile position of trying to maintain its neutral status. Britain 
controlled many of the supplies on which the Norwegian economy depended, 
and the American embargo of goods on European neutrals placed strains on 
Norway's trade. After negotiations with the United States and Britain, Norwegian 
exports of vital supplies were integrated into the allied efforts. Since Norway 
never was directly involved in the war or any political conflicts during this period, 
Norwegians continued to believe that military means were not needed in the 
conduct of Norwegian security policies and that the country's geographical 
remoteness from Central Europe would guarantee its peace. Norway emerged 
from World War I with its territory intact but its policy of strict neutrality 
weakened with its involvement in allied shipping. 
C. INTER-WAR PERIOD AND WORLD WAR II 
During the inter war period Norway maintained its policy of neutrality. 
Nevertheless, Norway did become a member of the League of Nations and by 
9Arne Olav Brundtland, Notwegian Security Policy: Defense and 
Nonprovocation in a Changing Context, in Gregory Flynn, ed., NATO's Northern 
Allies: The National Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark. The Netherlands & 
Norway (Totowa, NJ: Rowan & Allanheld, 1985), p. 172. 
10 
virtue of this subscribed to the policy of collective security. 10 There were mixed 
feelings amongst the Norwegian people over joining the League of Nations, 
especially from the proponents of neutrality, but, most were in favor. 
Membership in the League departed from the long standing Norwegian desire 
not to become entangled in organizations which could draw Norway into 
conflicts. In the League of Nations, no member could adopt a neutral position 
when it came to the issue of infringements of world peace. Norway's 
government, in keeping with its neutralist principles, nonetheless reserved the 
right to refrain from participating in military sanctions. Aside from this issue, 
Norway and the other Nordic states were active participants in the League's 
peacekeeping and humanitarian measures. Norway used its position as a small 
state to represent the moral and normative position on international issues. 11 
The Norwegians were, and still are, active players in promoting international 
arbitration agreements and negotiating peaceful settlements to conflicts. 
When tensions began to rise on the European continent after Hitler 
seized power in Germany, membership in the League showed signs of a ticket to 
becoming involved the developing European conflict. When this occurred, 
Norway sought release from its obligations toward collective action under article 
10Riste, p. 15. 
11 Baard Bredrup Knudson, Norway: Security Dilemmas and Current 
Issues, in Catherine M Kelleher and Gale A Mattox, eds., Evolving European 
Defense Policies (D.C. Heath and Company/Lexington, MA/Toronto: Lexington 
Books, 1987), p. 297. 
11 
16 of the League of Nations Covenant12 and shifted back to the position it took in 
World War I under the protective cover of the British Royal Navy. In this 
position Norway felt it would be protected from German aggression. The 
Norwegians gambled on Britain's interest in preventing Germany from acquiring 
bases in Norway and assumed that Britain would not need to use Norwegian 
territory. 13 Armed with this belief, its recently proclaimed disapproval of League 
obligations, its traditional neutrality, and the assumption of British naval 
supremacy in the North and Norwegian Seas, Norway in 1933 actually reduced 
the armed forces to a mere neutrality guard. 14 Norway failed to appreciate the 
developments in military technology being acquired by the major European 
powers and the rising power of Hitler in Germany. Norway did not recognize the 
increasing importance of its territory along the sea for basing airpower for naval 
protection. 15 Collective defense agreements between the Scandinavian 
countries were considered during this time, but, the disparities in their security 
concerns hindered cooperation. Finland feared the Soviet Union, Denmark 
feared Germany, and Sweden was undecided. Norway, on the other hand, did 
12Brundtland, p. 172. 
13lbid. 
14Rene Nyberg and Krister Wahlback, Security and Neutrality in the North 
of Europe and Changing East-West Relations, in Ciro Elliot Zoppo, ed., Nordic 
Security at the turn of the Twenty-first Century (Westport: Greenwood Press, 
1992), p. 58. 
15Brundtland, p. 173. 
12 
not fear anyone and continued to rely on its geographical remoteness as a key 
to its neutrality. 16 It took the imminent threat of war in the late 1930's to push 
defense issues to the forefront. But, it was not until early 1940 that the 
Norwegian Parliament approved increases in defense. By then it was too late. 
The Germans began planning an invasion of Norway in late 1939. 
Germany saw the need to establish strategic naval and air bases in Norway for 
several reasons. First, Germany did not want its fleet to become bottled up in 
the Baltic Sea as it had been in World War I. Second, Germany depended 
heavily on the iron ore mined in Sweden. This material was transported by rail 
from Sweden to Northern Norway, whence it was shipped to Germany. 17 
Finally, by occupying Norway and establishing strategic bases along the 
Western coast, Germany could prevent British control of the Norwegian area. 
This was seen as necessary because of an increased talk of Allied intervention 
in the Russo-Finnish War and the acceptance of a British proposal in JanlJary 
1940 by Norway and Sweden to allow British naval forces to operate inside 
Norwegian territorial waters. 18 In establishing bases in Norway, the German 
Armed Forces High Command felt it would be in a better position to conduct their 
"siege of Britain" by sea and air. 
16 lbid., p. 172. 
17Terry, p. 6. 
18Earl F. Ziemke, The German Decision to Invade Norway and Denmark, 
in Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., Command Decisions (Washington DC: U.S. 
Army, Center of Military History, 1987), p. 57. 
13 
"The single most important foreign-policy event for Norway was the 
German military attack on April 9, 1940. It shattered the Norwegian belief in 
pursuing national security based on strict neutrality and left a lasting imprint on 
her security policy."19 The invasion focused the attention of the defense and 
foreign policy elites on the fact that the defensive measures of a country cannot 
fluctuate with the presence of perceived threats but must be continually evolving 
over time. "The Norwegian experience of April 1940, in sum, provided a classic 
example of Henry Kissinger's assertion about what happens when a neutral 
state makes its defense dependent on the assistance of other countries: The 
result is a combination of the disadvantages of both neutrality and alliance. 
Concern about its non-alignment prevents such a state from making joint 
defensive preparations with a would-be protector, while at the same time the 
expectation of assistance reduces the requirement for national defense 
preparedness."20 The Norwegians felt that their neutrality would remain intact 
and that their proclamation of neutrality at the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 
would prevent them from being drawn into the conflict. Therefore, "plans for 
defense measures assumed only that Norway's neutrality could be randomly 
violated, and not deliberately breached or attacked. When the war broke out, 
19Brundtland, p. 173. 
20Riste, p 16. 
14 
naval and coastal artillery mobilization had to take place in steps because of a 
shortage of trained personnel and the poor state of the equipment."21 
Although the allies provided forces for the defense of Norway, it was too 
little and too late. Britain and France launched a counter invasion a week after 
Germany had invaded. Hasty planning, poor support, especially the lack of air 
power, vitiated the effort against the German forces. After the German invasion, 
the king and his government fled Norway and established a government in exile 
in England during the war. It was here that the king and his cabinet began to 
reassess Norway's foreign policy. The mainstays of Norway's strategic thinking, 
neutrality and isolationism, were moot. However, the German invasion had 
established three facts. "First, Norwegian territory proved too important to major 
European powers for them to refrain from attempting to occupy it. Second, 
Norwegian forces proved insufficient to deter or repel such an attempt. Finally, 
those states naturally allied to Norway acted too late to deter the attack, had 
insufficient strength to repel it, and withdrew too early to prevent occupation."22 
Despite the fact that the Germans invaded in April 1940, "the traditional 
doctrine of neutrality remained the dominant theoretical element in official 
foreign policy thinking until November of that year."23 At this time, there was a 
21 Tonne Huitfeldt, Force Mobilization in Norway, in Jeffrey Simon, ed., 
NATO-WARSAW Pact Force Mobilization (Washington, DC: The National 
Defense University Press, 1988), p. 523. 
22Brundtland, p. 172. 
231bid. 
15 
changing of the guard within the government in exile. Trygve Lie replaced 
Halvdan Koht as Foreign Minister. Koht was of the old guard whose 
experiences were influenced by the Norwegian national struggles at the turn of 
the century. Khat advocated a policy of unconditional neutrality to avoid 
involvement. Lie, on the other hand, had developed his ideologies during the 
inter-war period. 24 He favored a policy which came to be referred to as the 
"Atlantic Policy," a collaboration in a tightly knit security system which would 
unite the countries bordering the North Atlantic. 25 
The government also realized the future need for an alliance in order to 
provide Norway security. At this point Norway had to decide where to seek an 
alliance. Traditionally, Norway viewed itself as an Atlantic country, based on its 
long seafaring traditions. This led Norway to view a North Atlantic Alliance with 
Northwestern Europe and the United States as an option. The Norwegians 
viewed this as feasible since, ideologically, they felt the political traditions and 
culture of the "Atlantic peoples" more resembled theirs than the traditions of the 
peoples of Central Europe. This was based on the comparison of the personal 
liberties and constitutions of Norway and the English-speaking democracies 
whereas German culture was viewed as one of the sources of Nazism and 
24Nils Morten Udgaard, Great Power Politics and Norwegian Foreign 
Policy (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), p. 24. 
25lbid., p. 25. 
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Fascism. 26 In May 1942, the Norwegian Cabinet published a paper entitled 
"Main Principles of Norwegian Foreign Policy" which laid out its beliefs in the 
closest possible cooperation- military, economic, and political- among the 
nations bordering the North Atlantic. This plan was formulated to prevent 
another occurrence of German aggression in the post-war period. 27 
While the government in exile was working towards a new foreign policy, 
the members of the Home Front, the resistance movement in Norway, were 
developing their own foreign policy attitudes. The views of the two groups 
contrasted on many points. 28 The foreign policy attitudes of the resistance 
leaders were closer to the traditional Norwegian attitudes, non-alignment and 
neutrality, than to those of the government in London. The resistance leaders 
expressed a general distrust of Great Powers while emphasizing the importance 
of the Nordic countries and they did not view security solely in an Atlantic 
context. They also stressed the need to accommodate the Soviet Union in future 
security policy decisions and did not want any post-war commitments made 
during the war. 29 
The liberation of Norway prompted many concerns over Norway's position 
with the allied powers and the USSR. Soviet troops were the first to enter 
261bid., p. 27. 
27Riste, p. 17; see also Udgaard, p. 26. 
28Udgaard, p. 30. 
29lbid., p. 32. 
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Norwegian territory in the liberation of Norway. The Norwegian government's 
primary concern was with protecting its interests and sovereignty over a region 
that might be of interest to the USSR. It was imperative to prevent a Soviet 
occupation of Norway. The government in London pushed to get the Western 
allied powers and the USSR at the negotiating table to plan the liberation 
process. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), 
however, no longer felt that northern Norway was of military significance 
compared to the battles on the European continent. SHAEF also wanted to 
avoid becoming involved in any type of operation that might cause friction 
between the Western allies and the USSR. Hence, the Western powers and the 
USSR effectively fought two independent wars against Germany30with relatively 
little joint planning and operational coordination. 
The Soviet advance in pursuit of the Germans ended 65 miles into 
Norwegian Finnmark to Kirkenes. It was there that Stalin halted his forces and 
declared that he did not consider the liberation of Norway a Soviet task. Soviet 
forces, Stalin said, would turn to helping the peoples of Poland, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia. 31 Other possible explanations for the Soviet halt can be 
debated. Stalin may have judged that Norway fell within the Western sphere of 
influence. 32 On the other hand, by shifting to war efforts in Eastern Europe, 
30Udgaard, p. 63. 
31 1bid., p. 65. 
32 lbid.' p.66. 
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Stalin may have felt that he would be in a better position to claim it as a Soviet 
sphere of influence. 
The lack of information flowing from the USSR on its plans during the war 
caused great anxiety for the Norwegians. A lack of communications between 
SHAEF and the USSR placed Norway between the two powers, because SHAEF 
did not want to antagonize or cause friction with the Soviets in the final crucial 
stages of the war. 33 Norway's realization that it needed to be tied to an alliance 
that obligated others to provide assistance came during the German retreat. 
The Germans began laying waste to the Norwegian terrain. The Norwegians 
regarded this as a foreign policy, domestic policy and humanitarian issue. The 
allied powers, however, did not want to become involved in this issue for fear 
that they might antagonize the Soviets who were in the northern region. When 
appeals by Norway to the United States and Britain failed to gain the desired 
results, the Norwegians knew that if they were going to be guaranteed 
assistance it would have to be through a binding alliance. Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Lie knew that in the future the USSR would be an important factor for 
Norway and stated, "a good relationship with the Soviet Union will be one of the 
cornerstones of our foreign policy in the future. "34 
331bid.' p. 83. 
34lbid.' p. 94. 
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The immediate post-war period, 1945-1947, was a period of 
reconstruction for Norway. The belief that the Western powers would provide 
adequate security allowed Norway to concentrate on economic development 
while moving more slowly on military development. Towards the end of the war, 
concerns about the Soviet Union and its demands with regard to the Svalbard 
Archipelago overshadowed plans for an Atlantic policy. The establishment of a 
new world order through the United Nations was taking priority. With Trygve Lie 
becoming the first Secretary General of the United Nations, Norwegians felt that 
the UN would also be a sufficient guarantee of security during Norway's 
reconstruction. Norwegians believed that they could use the United Nations as 
a platform for bridgebuilding to foster cooperation between the Great Powers. 
Halvard Lange, who succeeded Lie as Norway's Foreign Minister, saw Norway's 
task as working to remove discontent and suspicion between the Great 
Powers. 35 It was believed that the United Nations could only be successful if the 
Great Powers cooperated. As long as the Great Powers could cooperate in the 
Security Council, Norway could concentrate on other matters.36 Foreign policy in 
this period concentrated on non-alignment, which somewhat resembled the pre-
war philosophy. The major point of this policy was to avoid anything that might 
35Einar Lochen, Norway in European and Atlantic Co-operation (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1964}, p. 12. 
36Brundtland, Norwegian Security Policy: Defense and Nonprovocation in 
a Changing Context, p. 173. 
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hinder the execution of the reconstruction strategy.37 One foreign policy area 
that Norway did enter was bridgebuilding between East and West. The policy of 
bridgebuilding had two primary objectives: 1) making collective security work by 
facilitating Great Power cooperation and, 2) to keep Northern Europe free from 
Great Power tension and rivalries. Although no "bridges" were actually built 
between the East and West, Norway pursued certain activities and refrained 
from others so as not to antagonize the Soviet Union. Additionally, Norway 
wanted to demonstrate that it was not allying with one power against another 
and thus not giving one a strategic advantage. Norwegian policy makers 
believed that by acting independently within the United Nations it might prevent 
the world from dividing into two power blocs. 38 
An attempt to establish a Nordic cooperation framework subordinated to 
wider cooperation in the United Nations was considered in 1945. During the war 
the government in exile had expressed this idea and the Home Front Leaders 
strongly endorsed it as well. Differences in foreign policy ideas prevented 
actual security and defense cooperation from developing. Sweden favored a 
neutrality league while Norway and Finland preferred to develop relations with 
the East and West and to serve as a bridge to further harmony between the two 
sides. 39 The reluctance of Norwegian leaders to subject themselves to joint 
37Udgaard p.1 07 & 1 09; see also Brundtland p.173. 
38Udgaard, p.149. 
39 lbid.' p. 150. 
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decision making with the Swedes and Danes in foreign policy also limited 
Nordic cooperation. In the early post-war years, Norway had gained a certain 
prominence and prestige in the world and in the United Nations and preferred to 
conduct its foreign policy within the framework of the United Nations. 
The Norwegians exhibited strong independence in their diplomacy during 
the early post-war years. These early years after the war saw Norway engage in 
close cooperation with the Western Powers in the military and economic fields, 
but Norway refrained from such an open policy in diplomatic areas. Political and 
diplomatic support were frequently denied to Britain and the United States in 
disagreements with the Soviet Union. A strict policy of East-West bridgebuilding 
was maintained. At the Paris peace conference and at the United Nations in 
1946, Norway emphasized its policies of non-alignment and bridgebuilding. The 
possibility of Norway joining a Western alliance for security was excluded in the 
immediate post-war years. The government had first rejected this prospect in 
December of 1945. Trygve Lie pointed out to the Starting that Norway was no 
longer on the periphery and would occupy an exposed strategic position in the 
future. Lie argued that a policy of alliances and "blocs" would decrease rather 
than increase Norway's security.40 The Soviet projection of power in the east in 
the liberation of northern Norway proved to Norwegian policy makers that they 
were in the proximity of a great power. Foreign policy makers attempted to steer 
40 lbid., p.171. 
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clear of the political disputes developing between the Soviet Union and the 
Western Powers over spheres of influence. This and other experiences in 
World War II taught Norway that it was strategically vulnerable in any clash 
between major powers in Europe. The growing significance of the Arctic and 
being in the "line of fire" between the United States and the Soviet Union led 
Norway's Chief of Defense, General Ole Berg, to believe that a pre-emptive 
attack might be made on Norway in the initial phase of a larger war. 41 Defense 
preparations were thus based on the period of time it was believed that Norway 
would have to fight alone before assistance would arrive. A four month delay 
was the time determined.42 
In 1947 there began another re-assessment of Norway's foreign policy 
when the country decided to participate in the US-sponsored Marshall Plan. 
Even though the Norwegians needed the economic assistance, their government 
was still reluctant to take a clear pro-Western stance on an issue that would 
manifest the division of Europe. 43 After the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia 
withdrew from the talks, it became an entirely Western measure. 
During this same year, the issue of the Svalbard Archipelago re-emerged. 
Interest in the Arctic region was increasing and in the new "air age" the two 




superpowers faced each other across the Arctic. 44 The Soviet Union was 
pressuring Norway to review the 1920 Svalbard Treaty which had given 
soverienty of the archipelago to Norway.45 Talks which had been initiated before 
the end of the war, when the Soviets claimed the treaties were invalid because 
they were concluded before the Soviet Union had become an important world 
power, had been suspended. 46 
As East-West tensions mounted, the Soviets began to portray the co-
operation between the Scandinavian countries as a device of Western influence 
in the north.47 Other events in 1947 and 1948 also influenced Norwegian foreign 
policy. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia had made a strong impression 
on public opinion as did the growing East-West conflict in Berlin. In 1948 the 
Swedes initiated talks on the establishment of a Scandinavian Defense Union. 
The idea of Nordic cooperation provoked suspicion and complaints from the 
Soviet Union. The security requirements of Norway and Sweden were not 
similar enough to establish a pact. The experiences of each country during 
World War II resulted in each looking to different solutions. Sweden's success 
with neutrality during the war, different geographical position, and larger defense 
44Udgaard, p. 196. 
45 lbid., p. 196-202; see also John Lund, Don't Rock the Boat: Reinforcing 
Norway in Crisis and War (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, P-737 4-RGS, 
1988), p.12. 
46Riste, p.18; see also Terry, p.15. 
47Udgaard, p.204. 
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forces enabled it to continue its policy of strict neutrality. Norway, on the other 
hand, was still haunted by the Nazi invasion of 1940 and knew that its 
requirements for security would go beyond the capabilities which could be 
provided by a Scandinavian Defense Union. At the time Sweden, which had 
heavily armed itself during the war, was one of the strongest military powers in 
Europe. This, however, did not convince the Norwegian government that a 
Scandinavian Defense Union would be powerful enough to thwart Soviet 
aggression. 48 The Norwegians, who had been seeking military aid from the 
United States and Britain, wanted an Atlantic connection in their defense efforts. 
When it was learned by the Norwegians that priority for arms sales by the United 
States would be given to its allies, Norway rejected the idea of the Scandinavian 
Defense Union. With the collapse of the Scandinavian defense negotiations, the 
door was opened for Norway to join the Atlantic alliance. 
D. COLDWAR 
"At the beginning of the Cold War, Norway had three security options: 
first, it could continue its neutrality while strengthening national defense; second, 
it could turn to an international-security arrangement on a regional basis in 
Scandinavia; or third it could join the countries that were in the process of 
forming· the Western Alliance."49 The option of neutrality had already been 
48Lund, p. 12. 
49Brundtland, Norwegian Security Policy: Defense and Nonprovocation in 
a Changing Context, p. 175. 
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proven ineffective by the events of World War II and the possibility of a 
Scandinavian Defense Union pact had already been explored and found 
wanting. 
Norwegian desires to join the Atlantic Alliance were based on the 
possibility of gaining protection under a security system based on deterrence 
provided by the Western powers. The Norwegians also hoped to obtain arms 
and military equipment in ways that would not interfere with civilian 
reconstruction. 5° Norway entered into the NATO alliance as one of its founding 
members in April 1949. The Starting had voted on March 29, 1949, 130 votes 
against 13, for joining NAT0.51 A majority of the population, 54 percent, felt that 
joining the alliance would increase Norway's security. 52 Membership in the 
NATO alliance has served as a deterrent to attacks on Norwegian territory. To 
stress the defensive nature of its alliance membership, Norway imposed a series 
of restraints and restrictions on its membership which can be seen as a legacy of 
Norway's neutralist attitude. 53 These self-imposed restrictions, most notably the 
non-basing policy, which prevented foreign troops from being permanently 
stationed in Norway, were in fact confidence-building measures designed to 
50 lbid., p. 177. 
51 Lochen, p. 13. 
52 Johan Jorgen Holst, Norwegian Security Policy: Options and 
Constraints, in Johan Jorgen Holst, ed., Five Roads to Nordic Security (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1973), p. 79. 
53 lbid. 
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show the Soviet Union Norway's desire to maintain stability and a low level of 
tension in the northern region. The basing policy was a compromise between 
the Labor government and the Atlanticists. The former sought to maintain the 
traditional neutralist policy while the latter favored NATO membership. 54 
Norwegian participation in NATO is characterized by a security policy 
approach comprised of deterrence and reassurance. 55 Deterrence is based on 
Norway's own national defense efforts and the reinforcements of NATO. 
' 
Reassurance is based on Norway's unilateral confidence-building measures. 
The non-basing policy, the prohibition of nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil 
and restrictions on NATO exercises in Norway, were aimed at presenting a 
nonprovocative security strategy. These restrictions were the basis for 
Norwegian foreign policies throughout the Cold War. The nonbasing policy was 
in a sense a signal of restraint and a message of reassurance to the Soviet 
Union: Norway would not allow the permanent basing of foreign troops on its soil 
unless attacked or exposed to the threat of attack. The assessment of threat 
would be made by Norwegian officials, and they maintain the right to revoke or 
change these unilateral policies if they feel threatened. The self-imposed 
54Lund, p. 14; see also Brundtland, p. 179. 
55Richard A. Bitzinger, The Politics of Defense in NATO's Northern Flank: 
Denmark, Norway and Iceland, in Ciro Elliot Zappa, ed., Nordic Security at the 
turn of the Twenty-first Century ( Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 152. 
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restraints that characterize the confidence-building measures in Norwegian 
security policy contributed to the stability and low level of tension in the region. 
The status quo that developed in the Nordic region during the Cold War 
was referred to as the Nordic Balance. The situation that produced the Nordic 
balance came from the complex security patterns the Nordic countries 
developed. The stability that was created in the region was maintained through 
the realization that changes in the security policies of one Nordic country might 
well prompt changes by the others. 
During the early part of the Cold War, Norway maintained a consistent 
foreign and security policy. Rearmament was taking place with assistance from 
the United States, and Norway was developing its ability to receive allied 
reinforcements in the event of a war. An issue which raised protests from the 
Soviet Union was the admittance of German liaison officers to AFNORTH56, 
NATO's regional command for the Northern Region. 57 The Soviet Union was 
protesting Norway's growing integration in NATO and the presence of German 
liaison officers on AFNORTH's staff in 1958 only exacerbated the situation. 
Soviet officials saw this as an insult to those that had fought against the 
Germans. Additionally, in 1958, the Soviets accused the Norwegians of violating 
the bases policy with the prepositioning of emergency supplies for German naval 
56AIIied Forces Northern Europe 
57Lund, p. 14. 
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ships in the south of Norway. Oslo, however, reserved the right to interpret the 
bases policy. Since there were no foreign "bases" being established during 
peacetime, the protests were rejected. 58 
The 1960s presented several incidents which tested the Norwegian ability 
to maintain the status quo in the region. The U-2 incident was the first issue 
which prompted complaints from the Soviets. The Soviets had been accusing 
the Norwegians of building airbases in northern Norway for American bombers. 
The accusations were repeatedly denied by the Norwegians. In May 1960, the 
shoot down of an American U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union and later 
discoveries by the Soviets that the pilot had instructions to land at Bodo, in 
northern Norway, led to serious accusations towards the Norwegians. The 
Norwegians denied claims that they had authorized the use of their bases for 
these flights. 59 
The second incident occurred two months later. An American RB-47 
reconnaissance plane was shot down over the Kola Peninsula. The Americans 
claimed the aircraft was over international waters. Again the Soviets used this to 
accuse the Norwegians of allowing their territory to be used by the United States 
for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. Soviet claims were again 
58 lbid., p. 15. 
59Lund, p. 15. 
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rejected. However, the Norwegians began a closer review of American and allied 
activities around Norway in a effort to prevent being put in a similar position. 60 
Criticisms and attacks from the Soviet Union concerning Norwegian 
security policies in the wake of these incidents prompted the Norwegians to 
revert to using the basing policy as a lever of influence. Complaints by the 
Soviets were dropped, however, when Norwegian Foreign Minister Lang issued 
a message to the Soviets that NATO was an integral part of Norwegian security 
policy and continued pressures in regards to this would result in a reexamination 
of the basing policy. Lang also issued a statement to the United States 
declaring that it should respect Norway's right to "preserve and expand good 
neighborly relations with the Soviet Union."61 
The "note crisis" of 1961 highlighted the Nordic Balance concept and the 
role of nonbasing policy as an instrument of Norwegian policy. 62 The principle of 
the Nordic Balance was to maintain the status quo in the Northern region. 
Finland based its security on neutrality and its friendship treaty with the Soviet 
Union. Finland's policy was a precondition to Norway and Denmark's nonbasing 
policies and alignment with NAT0. 63 Each side is held in check in order to 
preserve the balance. In October 1961, tensions were heightened when the 
60 lbid., p. 16. 
61 Lund, p. 16; see also Brundtland, p. 190. 
62Brundtland, p. 190. 
631bid. 
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Soviet Union sent a diplomatic note to Finland requesting consultations under 
Article II of their Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. The 
Soviets claimed there was a conspiracy to reestablish German domination in 
Northern Europe because of a growing West German influence in Denmark and 
Norway. 64 The Soviets assessed that this was a threat to Soviet-Finnish 
security, and the Soviets warned that countermeasures could be taken against 
Finland. The response by the Norwegians was quite clear: if the Soviets 
undermined Finnish neutrality, this would force Norway deeper into NATO and 
result in a reversal of its nonbasing policy and ban on storing nuclear weapons. 65 
The incident passed quietly but proved the relevance of the Nordic Balance and 
Norway's ability to use its basing policy as a foreign policy instrument. 
In the 1970s and early 1980s a greater emphasis was placed on the 
nonprovocative aspect of Norwegian NATO security policy. Political leaders in 
Norway that had experienced German occupation during World War II werE? 
being replaced by younger leaders who were less enthusiastic about the United 
States and NATO. The rise of the extreme left in politics disrupted the 
consensus on security matters that had been built. 66 The massive military 
64Arne Brundtland, The Context of Security in Northern Europe, in Paul M. 
Cole and Douglas M. Hart, eds., Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990's (Boulder and London: Westview Press and CSIS, Georgetown University, 1986), 
p. 17; see also Lund, p. 17. 
65Brundtland, p. 17; see also Lund, p. 18. 
66Lund, p. 19; see also Bitzinger, p. 160. 
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buildup in the Kola Peninsula region by the Soviet Union added to the tension 
since it directly affected the security of Norway and resulted in greater reliance 
on commitments from allied and NATO forces. 
The prepositioning of equipment for the Fourth U.S. Marine Amphibious 
Brigade (MAB) in the late 1970s was seen by some Norwegian officials as a 
violation of its non-basing policy and provocative towards the Soviets.67 The 
Norwegians were in a period where they were reassessing the reassurance-
deterrence strategy and inclined to favor a more nonprovocative image. Initially 
the proposal called for the prepositioned equipment to be placed in northern 
Norway, as desired by the United States and Norwegian military authorities. The 
supplies, however, were finally located in central Norway where they would 
present a lower profile and more defensive posture. This change in location was 
in response to Soviet protests about "violations" in the basing policy. The 
debate among Norwegian party officials had centered on the confidence in 
American political judgement and objectives. The outcome of the debate 
satisfied the major participants. 68 Additionally, the Norwegian government 
insisted that the air element of the MABs exclude the long-range A-6 Intruders 
which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.69 It had been the expansion of 
67Bitzinger, p.161. 
68Lund, p.21. 
69Lund, p.21; see also Johan Jorgen Holst, The Security Pattern in 
Northern Europe: A Norwegian View, in Geoffrey Till, ed., Britain and NATO's 
Northern Flank (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London: The 
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the Soviet military installations on the Kola Peninsula that had prompted this 
prepositioning of equipment. The Norwegian government initiated the 
propositioning plan as a response to this perceived change in the military 
balance in the region, and it made adjustments to the plan to maintain the low 
level of tension. 
The Soviet buildup in the Kola peninsula and the United States Forward 
Maritime Strategy70 is another example of the Norwegian government's efforts to 
maintain a low tension level. Norwegian concerns over growing Soviet naval 
activity in the Norwegian Sea prompted Norwegian requests for an increase in 
U.S. naval presence in the region. This was deemed necessary since a former 
head of the Norwegian Military Intelligence Service, Admiral Jan lngebrigtsen, 
pointed out that the Soviet Union had replaced the British Navy as the dominant 
naval force in the region. 71 However, an increase of U.S. naval activity in the 
northern region was perceived as a threat to the Soviet Union, according to 
Mikhail Gorbachev. He blamed NATO and especially the United States for the 
militarization in the North. 72 The result was a call by many Norwegians, 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), p. 41. 
70Rodney Kennedy-Minott, U.S. Regional Force Application: The Maritime 
Strategy and Its Effect on Nordic Stability (Palo Alto, CA Hoover Institution, 
1988), pp. 24-33. 
71 1bid., p. 25. 
72Burkhard Auffermann, New Thinking in Soviet Foreign Policy and Nordic 
Security, in Ciro Elliot Zappa, ed., Nordic Security at the turn of the Twenty-first 
Century (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 176. 
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including Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst, for initiatives that would prevent 
the "mediterraneanization" of the Norwegian Sea and a disruption of the 
sensitive situation in the north. 73 
E. POST -COLD WAR 
Now that the Cold War is over and the threat of Russian tanks rolling over 
the border into northern Norway has diminished, the challenges for Norway's 
security have also changed. "This clear and present danger associated with 
specific threat scenarios has been replaced by unspecified dangers."74 Military 
issues are no longer the principal national security concern. Policy makers are 
now occupied with new political challenges in constructing a network of 
nonmilitary cooperative relations concerning the exploitation of resources, 
protecting the environment and managing economic activity in the Arctic. 75 
Siri Bjerke noted in a speech in September 1995 that "the very concepts of 
security and security policy have seen significant changes over the last few 
years. The concept of extended security has gained broad acceptance. In 
addition to military security, this encompasses the relationship between 
73Kennedy-Minott, p.26; see also Bitzinger, p. 161. 
74Johan Jorgen Holst, NATO and the Norlhern Region: Security and Arms 
Control, in Paul J. Cook, ed., Change and Continuity in Europe's Northern 
Region (Washington DC: CSIS, val. XIII, no. 4, 1991 ), p. 23. 
751bid. 
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democracy, state and society, social stability, and environmental concerns."76 
Population explosion, mass migration and desertification are a sampling of 
issues which fall into this category of extended security however, concentration 
here will be on the environment. 
Environmental degradation is one of these "green" issues that in the past 
had taken a "backseat" to a Soviet/Russian military threat. With the help of 
environmental organizations like Bellona and Greenpeace, international 
attention to the environmental problem is gaining attention. Environmental 
degradation presents a threat to Norway's population and economic interests in 
the Northern region and in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. In 1993, 
Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Holst issued a statement that said "Russian 
pollution was the biggest security problem Norway faces.' 177 Years of dumping 
radioactive waste and nuclear reactors, scuttling nuclear submarines in these 
waters, sulfur dioxide emissions from nickel plants, and two high-risk nuclear 
power plants have created potential hazards to the fishing industry and to the 
health of people living in the northern region. Additionally, Robert Bathurst of 
the Peace Research Institute in Oslo points to another potential environmental 
problem. The increasing morale decline and chaos in the Russian armed forces 
76Siri Bjerke, Norwegian State Secretary, in a speech on "The 




"Radioactive Waste," BNA International Environment Daily, August 17, 
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has added to the threat of potential nuclear accidents. Nuclear submarines are 
stored all over the Kola Peninsula and as a result of this morale decline, people 
do not care about important safety checks and technical standards fall when 
spare parts and maintenance fail to materialize. 78 
The Norwegians have emphasized the need to establish working 
relationships between themselves, Russia and the West in order to solve the 
problems of cross-border pollution without conflicts. Action has been initiated for 
cooperation in the Barents Region as laid down in the Kirkenes Declaration on 
January 11, 1993.79 The Barents Euro-Arctic council concentrates on seven 
areas of cooperation: the environment, economic cooperation, science and 
technology, regional infrastructure, indigenous peoples, cultural relations and 
tourism. 80 The European Union and TACIS81, a program developed by the EU, 
are also becoming involved in the environmental situation in Russia. 
The controversy about cleaning up the Arctic will be a continuing tension 
point between the governments affected. It comes down to responsibility, cost, 
78Robert Bathurst, "Decaying Northern Fleet Threatens Norway," 
Aftenposten Sondag, November 20, 1994, p. 3. 
79The Kirkenes Declaration was signed by the Nordic Countries, Russia, 
and the European Union. They form what is called the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the 
United States, Canada and Japan participate as observers. 
80 Johan Jorgen Holst, The Barents Region: Institutions, Cooperation and 
Prospects, in Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander, eds., The Barents Region: 
Cooperation in Arctic Europe (London: SAGE Publications, PRIO, 1994), p.11. 
81Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
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credibility, and priorities. The Russian government's perceived reluctance to 
disclose all the information on the known pollution in the region prohibits an 
accurate assessment as to cleanup requirements and potential hazards to 
people and the environment. The Russian government has even accused a 
retired navy captain of high treason and charged him with espionage. Alexander 
Nikitin, who was working as an analyst for the Norwegian Environmental group 
Bellona, was accused of turning over secret information on the Russian nuclear 
fleet. Bellona representatives say Nikitin was only used to sort technical 
information. Bellona has been collecting information on the safety of Russian 
nuclear facilities, submarines, and storage facilities. 82 "Environmental groups 
have complained that efforts to expose laxity in Russian storage of nuclear 
material, especially in the military, are meeting with harassment from security 
agencies."83 Instances like this will continue to cast a shadow of doubt over 
Russia's commitment to disclose pertinent information that is needed to assist in 
the clean up of the environment. 
The neighboring Scandinavian countries, Germany, France, the European 
Union, and the United States have all pledged monetary and technical support 
for the operations which have been estimated to cost between 230 and 270 
82David Hoffman, "Russia Says Ex-Officer Spied for Ecologists." 
International Herald Tribune, February 13, 1996, p.2. 
83 lbid. 
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billion dollars.84 A breakdown of international support will be given in the next 
chapter. 
84
"Nuclear Pollution: Radioactivity Reaches Alarming Proportions in 
Northern Russia." Europe Environment, February 21, 1995. 
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Ill. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
A. NON-MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES 
During the Cold War, the major threat to the security of Norway was the 
presence of Soviet Northern Fleet and Soviet missiles on the Kola Peninsula. 
After the end of the Cold War, the Kola Peninsula Region and the Russian 
Northern Fleet posed a new threat to Norwegian security, the presence of a 
decaying nuclear submarine fleet, radioactive waste storage facilities and nickel 
processing plants in the Kola peninsula. 
"After 7 4 years of Communist environmental pollution mismanagement, 
the former Soviet Union which once spanned a sixth of the globe has become an 
environmental cesspool that is threatening its neighbors in Europe and Asia. "85 
The Soviet Union built its nuclear program and its industries, during these years 
under communism, with little or no regard for the damage it was inflicting on the 
environment. 
Until a few years ago, environmental pollution was not at the forefront of 
many countries national security concerns. However, in recent years the 
Scandinavian countries have taken the lead in their concern for the environment 
as one of their security concerns. These concerns were nothing new to Norway 
but, after the fall of the Soviet Union, more people began to speak out and more 
85Paul Hofeinz, "the New Soviet Threat: Pollution," Fortune, June 27, 
1992, p.110. 
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information was made available to the public. This concern gained more 
credibility in 1991 when Andrei Zolotkov, an engineer from the Murmansk 
Shipping Company, provided details to the Norwegian government about the 
locations and dates of radioactive waste dumping in the Arctic by the Murmansk 
Shipping Company and the Russian Navy from 1961-1990. Although it had 
been previously known that the Russians were polluting the Arctic, a United 
States satellite detected radioactive emissions off the Lista fjord 70 miles from 
Norway in 1982, the extent of the contamination was unknown.86 Official 
recognition of dumping in the Arctic, which had long been denied by the 
leadership of the former Soviet Union, came in March of 1993 with the release of 
a report by a special commission headed by Alexey V. Yablokov, environmental 
advisor to Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin. 87 
International efforts have been made to prevent the pollution of the 
oceans but these efforts have either been ignored because of lack of 
enforcement or too little too late. Internationally, the 1972 London Dumping 
Convention (LDC) went into effect 30 August 1975 and covers all maritime areas 
except internal seas. The LDC outlawed the disposal of high-level radioactive 
wastes at sea and required that nations desiring to dispose of medium and low 
8601e Mathismoen, "Kola Nuclear Waste Storage Facility 'Leaking'," 
Aftenposten, February 11, 1995, p.4. 
87R. Monastersky, "Hazard from Soviet nuclear dumps assessed," Science 
News, vol. 143, May 15, 1993, p. 310. 
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level radioactive wastes do so in ocean basins at depths greater than 12,000 
feet. The LDC prohibits the dumping of high level wastes. Medium and low 
level wastes require special permits and notification of the Secretariat of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and necessitates the presence of an 
observer. This Observer comes from an authorized international organization 
and looks for three main IAEA requirements when dumping: 1) location of 
dumping outside continental shelf zone and internal and land locked seas, 2) 
depths of at least 4,000 meters, and 3) disposal only in regions between 50 
degrees North latitude and 50 degrees South latitude. Depths in the Barents 
and Kara Seas, where the Soviet Dumping had taken place, ranged from 200 
feet to 1,000 feet. 88 Russia even enacted its own environmental standards in 
1991 in an attempt to control the level of pollution not only from ocean dumping, 
but also from other facilities including nuclear weapons facilities and nickel 
smelters. Unfortunately, these limits were continually exceeded without 'thought 
and when fines were levied, the value of the ruble was so low that it was viewed 
as a joke. Alexei Yabalov, Chairman of the Government Commission on 
Questions Connected with the Sea-Dumping of Radioactive Waste, issued a 
press statement confirming the fact that low-level dumping of radioactive waste 
in the Arctic by the Russian Navy continues despite a supposed ban on such 
88Patrick E. Tyler, "Soviet's Secret Nuclear Dumping Causes Worry for 
Arctic Waters," The New York Times, May 4, 1992, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 1. 
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acts. 89 Some scientists believe the Russian Navy continues its dumping 
practices since they, the navy, do not have the capability or processing facilities 
to dispose of the waste properly. 
Norway fears the radioactive contamination, in addition to a health threat, 
as a potential threat to its economy. In 1992, Norway's Defense Minister was 
quoted in an interview as saying, "If the rumor gets around that Norwegian and 
Russian fish are contaminated with radioactivity, we aren't going to sell many 
fish." This would have a devastating effect on the fishing industry in Norway and 
likewise would be an economic problem for Russia as well. If the fisheries in the 
Arctic waters near Norway and Alaska become contaminated with radioactive 
waste, Russia, which depends on fish exports as a critical hard-currency earner, 
would add more problems to its already weak economy. 90 Some effects of the 
pollution that have come from mainland Russia has already been seen in 
Norway. After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, in the north of Finland, Sweden, 
and Norway, herds of reindeer had to be destroyed, as a result of radioactive 
fallout from Chernobyl, to prevent native Lapps from eating their radioactive 
flesh. 91 This same incident could occur if the radioactive contamination from 
89 Joshua Handler, "Russian Navy Nuclear Submarine Safety, 
Construction, Defense Conversion, Decommissioning, and Nuclear Waste 
Disposal Problems." Trip Report: Greenpeace Visit to Moscow and Russian Far 
East July-November 1992, February 15, 1993, p. 25. 
90Tyler, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 1. 
91 Hofeinz, p.11 0. 
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ocean dumping were to enter the food chain through the fishing industry, which, 
between Norway and Russia are two of the world's largest. The emissions of 
sulfur dioxide from two nickel processing plants in Kirkenes, just a few kilometers 
from the Norwegian border, is three times the total emission from all of Norway. 92 
The effects of the pollution have also had dramatic effects on the people 
that live in the Kola Peninsula region. Lung cancer, lead poisoning and 
emphysema are epidemic among workers in the factories and mines. Women 
have the highest rates of spontaneous abortions anywhere and, malformed 
hearts and bone-marrow defects afflict more than 25 percent of all babies. Data 
gathered by the Murmansk Department of Health suggest that more than 40 
percent of industrial workers suffer from respiratory disease, which is five times 
Russia's daily norm. Additionally, the average male life expectancy is 50 years, 
among the lowest in the developed world. 93 
B. ORIGINS OF POLLUTION 
Where has all this pollution come from? There are different sources of 
pollution in the Arctic region. Primarily, the radioactive pollution has come from 
the dumping practices and wastes generated by the Russian (former Soviet 
92Gro Brundtland, Remarks by the Prime Minister of Norway before a 
luncheon meeting of the European Institute. 18 May 1994. 
93Michael Spector, "One of the Most Polluted Places on Earth," 
International Herald Tribune, March 29, 1994. 
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Union) Northern Fleet, dumping by the civilian run Murmansk Shipping Company 
which operates nuclear powered icebreakers, the rivers and fjords emptying into 
the Arctic which have been contaminated by nuclear facilities, weapons 
factories, waste ponds, and accident sites in Siberia. Another source of 
pollution is the emission of sulfur dioxide which originates from the nickel 
processing plants on the Kola Peninsula. 
Pollution in the region has been broken down into three categories, 
reactors, liquid waste, and solid waste. Information gathered and presented by 
Greenpeace and information presented by a 46 member Russian commission 
reveals that since 1965, 18 nuclear reactors were dumped into the Arctic Ocean 
on the eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya. Of these, 15 were from naval vessels 
and three were from the nuclear powered icebreaker Lenin which suffered a 
major nuclear accident around 1966.94 Seven of the reactors still contained their 
fuel when dumped and, all but one of the reactors were dumped in shallow water 
of 50 meters or less. 
1. Kola Peninsula 
The Fleet Headquarters of the Russian Northern Fleet submitted a letter 
to the Yablokov Commission admitting that up to ten thousand cubic meters of 
liquid waste and two thousand cubic meters of solid waste are discharged into 
the Arctic Ocean annually. "Liquid waste was disposed of in five areas of the 
94Handler, p. 19. 
44 
Barents Sea to the west and southwest of Novaya Zemlya. Some 164,717 cubic 
meters with a total inventory of 490,795 GBq95 were dumped. Solid waste was 
disposed of at seven sites along the west edge of Novaya Zemlya. Some 
11,090 containers weighing 3,738 tons with a total inventory of 2,272,060 GBq 
were dumped. "96 
The Kola Peninsula presents itself as one of the largest environmental 
hazards in the Arctic region. It is here that Russia maintains its powerful 
nuclear submarine fleet. The "Northern fleet operates more than 200 nuclear 
propulsion reactors in its ballistic missile and attack submarines, which are 
based along the fjords of the Kola Peninsula. Together with surface ships and 
naval air forces, they represent the largest concentration of former Soviet naval 
power."97 Within this conglomeration of naval power, 71 nuclear submarines 
await dismantling. 16 of these submarines have already had their fuel removed 
while 55 still have fuel in their reactors. According to the START II agreement, 
150 nuclear submarines (Russian) are to be dismantled. These submarines will 
come from both the Pacific and Atlantic fleets. All except 22 of these 
958ecquerels, 1 bq=2. 7x1 0 -11 cesium-137. 
96Handler, p. 19. 
97Tyler, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 1. 
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submarines have two reactors which gives a total of 278 nuclear reactors which 
will be removed need to be stored. 98 
One of the most severe nuclear risks in the region comes from the 
storage ship Lepse which contains a radiation danger of over half the radiation 
that was emitted from Chernobyl. The 83 meter long vessel tied up in Murmansk 
harbor only a short distance from apartment buildings. Lepse, which is only 
corded off from the public with "nuclear hazard" symbols, is packed full of partly 
dismantled, but highly active fuel rods. The ship is contaminated to a level that 
the entire vessel must be treated a nuclear waste. 99 
The Norwegian environmental group Bellona has been credited with the 
idea of creating a cement dry dock in which to seal the ship. Bellona piloted the 
project in order to make safe some of the nuclear waste stored in the region. 
Fear of the ship, Lepse, capsizing or sinking in the harbor or even worse, an 
accident causing a chain reaction, prompted the group to attack the probl~m. 
This idea was decided on after the rejection of two other options. First, the idea 
was to cut the ship into smaller pieces and transport to other storage units, 
however, more than 5,000 people would have been needed to prevent anyone 
from being exposed above the permitted limits. The second idea entailed towing 
98Thomas Nilsen and Nils Bohmer, "Sources of Radioactive 
Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties," Bellona Report Vol. 1, 
1994, p. 49. 
9901e Mathismoen, "Project to Make Safe Murmansk Nuclear Waste Ship," 
Aftenposten, October 3, 1994, p. 3. 
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the ship to the southern tip of Novaya Zemlya where a channel would be blasted 
into the permafrost and the ship would then be covered. The former was viewed 
as not feasible and the latter would have been too costly and was not 
permanent. The solution for the Lepse needed to be permanent since its 
contents must be classed as radioactive waste for 200,000 to 300,000 years. 
The permafrost idea would not have worked since the possibility of global 
warming or climate changes could affect the permafrost in the future. 
Storage facilities on the Lista fjord are another potential hazard. Located 
just 70 kilometers from Norway, one of the two storage facilities for highly active 
nuclear waste is draining radioactive water directly into the fjord. The Russian 
Northern Fleet, which operates the storage facility, is unable to repair the 
buildings because the ship used to take the spent fuel rods away is out of 
commission. The ship, Siverka, is in such poor shape the Russian Navy fears it 
will sink if used. 100 The storage tanks in the area are filled with water and the 
fuel rods, hanging from an apparatus, are lowered into the water to cool. In 
1986 there was a situation where several rods fell to the bottom of the tank 
because the apparatus holding them rusted away. Experts have warned that 
this situation could have triggered a nuclear chain reaction in the uranium. The 
specific tank in which this accident happened was supposed to be emptied and 
not used again, however, by 1989 this same storage unit contained as many as 
10001e Mathismoen, "Kola Nuclear Waste Storage Facility 'Leaking'," 
Aftenposten, February 11, 1995, p. 4. 
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10,000 spent fuel rods. The holes in all the tanks are so bad that they 
continually need to be refilled. The seriousness of the situation comes from the 
potential for a disastrous nuclear chain reaction if the rods fall down or, if the 
tank itself collapses. Western scientists know that these units do not meet 
international standards but have been unable to confirm this. "The Russian 
Navy is not giving the Russian nuclear inspectorate permission to inspect the 
facilities on Lista Fjord, even though it has been instructed to do so by President 
Boris Yeltsin to draw up a report on the state of the military storage facilities."101 
The Norwegian government does not see the leaks as an immediate threat to 
fishing in the Barents Sea, however, its greatest fear is a chain reaction if an 
accident occurs. 
2. Barents and Kara Seas 
In 1992, a Russian scientist in Murmansk revealed that, contrary to 
official reports, the dumping of liquid and solid nuclear waste in the Barents Sea 
had been happening for nearly 30 years. These dumping sites were located 
several hundred miles off the coast of Norway in known fishing areas. 
Thousands of containers of solid radioactive waste from the Northern Fleet and 
icebreakers were dumped into the Barents Sea in sealed containers. In 
101 1bid. 
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instances where the containers would not sink, Soviet seamen were said to have 
cut holes in the "sealed" containers so they would. 102 
Norwegian scientists have been conducting tests in the Barents and 
Norwegian Seas for several years and have only registered small amounts of 
radioactivity in the Barents Sea. This radioactivity in the Barents Sea was 
attributed to the fallout from Soviet nuclear tests and from the explosion that 
released a cloud of radioactive matter from the Chernobyl accident in 1986.103 In 
1993, a joint Russian-Norwegian research team visited the Barents and Kara 
Seas, to take samples and test for the presence of radioactive particles, the 
expedition was not allowed to approach any closer than 12 kilometers from the 
suspected dump sites as the Russian navy prohibited closer access. 
In April 1989, the Komsomolets, a nuclear-powered submarine, caught 
fire and sank in approximately 1600 meters of water 310 miles off the coast of 
Norway. The reactor in the submarine is already leaking Cesium-137, a 
carcinogenic isotope, but, the immediate threat comes from the two nuclear-
tipped torpedoes containing 28 lbs. of plutonium with a half life of 24,000 years 
and a toxicity so high that a speck can kill. 104 Concern surrounds the fact that 
the immanent leakage of this plutonium could enter the food chain and 
102Tyler, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 1 . 
103lbid. 
104James 0. Jackson, "Nuclear Time Bombs," Time, December 7, 1992, 
p. 44. 
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contaminate vast reaches of ocean as early as this year. Dutch and Norwegian 
scientists organized a "Komsomolets Foundation" and, in conjunction with the 
Norwegian environmental group Bellona, have pressed to gain international 
attention and cooperation in investigating the problem. Different suggestions on 
solutions to the problem have ranged from raising the submarine to encapsuling 
it with cement. Small submarines have been sent down to video the sunken 
wreck to assist in assessing the condition of the hull and the feasibility of raising 
it and, to see if they can assess the condition of the torpedoes. "The situation is 
difficult because (the submarine) is located on a slope," says Knute Eric Nilsson, 
a researcher with Bellona. "Moving it or raising it could cause it to break up."105 
A recent study by other scientists in the region indicated that ocean current 
flowing from the Komsomolets could end up in waters heavily fished by 
Norwegian, Canadian, Icelandic, and other trawler fleets. 106 An attempt to move 
the sunken submarine could cause a nuclear chain reaction or damage the 
torpedoes. Already, Bellona has taken a measure of radioactivity of 20 times 
higher than normal in one spot where the Komsomolets went down, this means it 
has already begun to leak. 107 
105
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3. Novaya Zemlya 
Novaya Zemlya is an archipelago where the Soviet Union conducted 
bomb tests, scuttled submarines, and disposed of waste containers. These two 
islands, used as the only nuclear-weapons testing range after the Soviets closed 
the testing ground in central Asia, are considered one of the most poisoned sites 
in the Arctic. Russia also used these islands as a nuclear garbage bin where it 
admitted to dropping 17,000 barrels of radioactive waste into the surrounding 
seas since 1964. 108 
In 1992, Russian and Western experts were allowed to take samples in 
the Kara Sea for the first time. Virtually no other independent testing has been 
allowed in the Kara Sea and along the coasts of Novaya Zemlya since this has 
been considered home waters by the Soviet Navy during the Cold War years. 109 
The dumped nuclear reactors containing fuel rods are considered to present on 
of the greatest ecological hazards of all the sunken waste. Most of these 
reactors lie in shallow inlets at depths of only 20 to 50 meters with one in a 
depression of 300 meters off the coast of Novaya Zemlya. In every case, the 
reactor core suffered damage that prevented the removal of spent nuclear fuel. 
In all but one case, the reactor compartments were filled with a self-hardening 
polymer which was believed would isolate the fuel rods from seawater. 110 
108 Jackson, p. 44. 
109Tyler, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 1. 
110Monastersky, p.31 0. 
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Results from another expedition to the region around Novaya Zemlya 
indicate that the nuclear testing has "impacted" the marine life within a 2,000 km 
radius. Nuclear testing on Novaya Zemlya is claimed to be the reason for the 
· deaths of seals which died of cancer due to exposure of toxic and radioactive 
substances. 111 
4. Yenisey and Ob Rivers 
Pollution emanating from the interior of Russia another source of 
contamination for the Arctic Ocean. Freshwater runoffs from rivers flowing north 
have been contaminated by waste water stored in reservoirs or ponds and direct 
dumping by nuclear and military facilities. Some scientists feel that a potential 
disaster could result from a dam break or a nuclear accident inland in which the 
rivers are contaminated and in turn, contaminate everything in the rivers path as 
it flows to the ocean. 
Mayak, a nuclear weapons production site, suffered a nuclear accident in 
1957. Reports of up to 120 million Ci of radioactive wastes from Mayak have 
accumulated in the water and sediments of nearby Lake Karachai. This 
represents nearly 50 times the waste dumped by the Soviet Union in the Arctic 
Ocean. 112 "As a result, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists estimates that a person 
111 D.J. Bradley, "Radioactive Contamination of the Arctic Region, Baltic 
Sea, and the Sea of Japan from Activities in the Former Soviet Union," Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory. September 1992, p. 6. 
112Monastersky, p.311. 
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can get a lethal dose of radiation in less than an hour just standing on the bank 
of the lake."113 Nearby the Mayak facility, 200,000 Ci is stored in a collection of 
reservoirs that are in danger of overflowing the dams. The water from this 
region ultimately flows to the Arctic Ocean via the Ob River. Western scientists 
still know little about the extent of the pollution which flows from this and other 
military facilities in the region to the Arctic Ocean. The Techa River is a similar 
problem. After years of dumping, this river carries radioactive waste 1 00 miles 
where it empties into the Arctic. 
These are just a few of the examples that are known to Western scientists 
and researchers. Until all the reports on weapons producing sites and storage 
facilities are revealed the full extent of the problem will remain unknown. 
C. STORAGE FACILITIES 
The Russian Navy currently lacks the capability to store or dispose of the 
nuclear waste that it is generating from the ships it is operating. Additionally, 
Russia does not have the storage capacity, the technology nor the financial 
means to dismantle the nuclear ships and reactors. Many disarmed submarines 
and nuclear waste sit amidst the population in the port of Murmansk and is 
beginning to cause concern among many people. The vast majority of the 
storage units in the area are not up to international standards and should have 
been removed years ago. "Russia's current capacity to process waste is in the 
113Hofeinz, p.11 0. 
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order of 1,200 cubic meters a year, whereas it should really be 5,000 cubic 
meters."114 
D. REMEDIATION 
Financially, the Russian military and government do not have the money 
to fund the cleanup of the pollution in the Arctic region which is estimated, by 
one source, to cost between 230 and 270 billion dollars. 115 Consequently, 
environmental cleanup is a very low priority. Other countries are willing to assist 
Russia in this task. The Scandinavian countries pledged more than $200 million 
to renovate the nickel factories but, the total cost for the overhauling exceeds $2 
billion and it is not believed that Russia will come up with the remainder. A joint 
Norwegian and United States effort is contributing 1.6 million US dollars into 
building a nuclear waste processing plant in Murmansk and, Bellona has been 
responsible for establishing contacts and coordinating some of the first projects 
to attack the problems in the Kola Peninsula. The U.S. Congress appropriated 
$10 million to the Department of Defense to assess the radioactive threat in the 
Arctic Ocean. Additionally, there is currently a tri-lateral working group between 
the United States, Norway, and Russia to establish a program to deal with the 
environmental problems in the Arctic. 
114
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Even with all the pledged assistance, Russia still seems to be dragging its 
feet when it comes to attacking the problem. Russian military leaders claim they 
do not even have the finances to dismantle the decommissioned submarines 
which will cost $1 million each (a total of $10 million in just 1995). But, when the 
budget battles begin, environmental cleanup is not what military leaders are 
interesting in obtaining funding for. The civilians who are concerned about 
these problems do not have the political clout to get the funding needed. 
Internationally, Norway, Sweden, the United States and the European 
Union have all allocated funds for environmental projects in the former Soviet 
Union. In 1995 alone, Norway proposed $20 million for radiation protection, 
waste management and prevention of contamination of the sea. 116 Norway has 
also allocated approximately $48 million for a project to help reduce the sulfur 
dioxide pollution from the nickel plants in the Kola Peninsula region. It is 
estimated that Sweden has spent about $10 million on similar projects. 117 As of 
August 1995, the United States had committed $55 million to support various 
programs that focus on the environment and health effects as a result of nuclear 
weapons production in the former Soviet Union. A contribution of ECU 55 million 
116
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was made by the European Union for Euro-Arctic cooperation projects, several 
of which will deal with nuclear safety. 118 
118
"EU/Arctic: New Economic and Ecological Cooperation Launched." 
Europe Environment, October 20, 1995. 
56 
IV. EURO-ATLANTIC ORGANIZATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
"Norwegian foreign and security policy has taken account of the changes 
in the Euro-Atlantic security agenda. What Norway sees emerging is a policy 
which is a blend of older factors which remain relevant, and elements which 
have emerged in response to the new challenges." 119 Norway is stressing the 
concept of extended security to the European and international arena. One of 
the goals of Norway is to emphasize the cross-border nature of environmental 
pollution and the need for international cooperation. Assistance to developing 
countries, in this case Russia is included, in establishing environmental 
considerations into development plans will assist in controlling future problems. 
The establishment of broader security challenges has also resulted in the 
expansion of policies and institutions to deal with the changes. At the forefront 
of this new policy, Norway sees the protection of the fragile Arctic environment 
as a key element in its current and future foreign and security policies. Norway 
has spearheaded several bilateral and international efforts to bring attention to 
the Barents and Arctic regions. 
119Siri Bjerke, Norwegian State Secretary, in a speech on "The 
Environment and Security in the North Atlantic Region," at Reykjavik, 7 
September 1995. 
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The unstable situations in Russia, economically and politically, give rise 
to new challenges in dealing with Norway's neighbor to the East. The 
deplorable state of the Kola Peninsula region is one of the security tasks that 
Norway is currently faced with. The Russian government is incapable, 
financially, of making amends to the situation and Norway cannot afford to fund 
the cleanup alone. Likewise, the internal turmoil and political instability in 
Moscow draw attention from the periphery. Hence, issues which are of 
importance to local governments in the Barents Region are overlooked. The 
emphasis on establishing democracies in the former Soviet states must also 
include assistance in dealing with environmental problems. By establishing 
relationships with Russia in the Barents Region, Norway hopes to emphasize its 
environmental concerns while developing working relationships with Russia in 
other areas, including social and technological areas. 
The establishment of relations with Russia in the Barents Region is. not an 
entirely new concept. During the period 1814 to 1917, Russia and Norway . 
traded along the northern Norwegian and northern Russian coasts in what was 
called the Pomor trade. Norwegian fishermen traded their catch for supplies of 
wood and grain provided by their Russian counterparts. Although the 
relationship between the two countries in this period was not totally without 
disagreements or a sense of distrust, differences were settled without major 
conflicts. Today, however, in the post-Cold War world, the Barents Region is 
different and the Kola Peninsula is one of many legacies of the former Soviet 
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Union. Once strictly controlled, politically and economically, by Moscow, the . 
Kola Peninsula region thrived on the military establishment and contained the 
largest concentration of military power in the world. 
Norway has historically preferred to address security and foreign policy 
issues diplomatically rather than militarily. In the post-Cold War world, Norway 
has emphasized environmental hazards, ethnic conflicts, and economic 
disparities as jeopardizing Norwegian security while downplaying military 
threats. 120 In keeping with this tradition, Norway has "constructed a network of 
nonmilitary cooperative relations concerning the exploitation of resources, 
protection of the environment, and management of economic activity in the 
Arctic."121 By establishing itself as a Nordic bridge between the United States, 
Russia, NATO, and the EU, Norway's challenge is to form a connective tissue 
among the Atlantic, European, and Nordic frameworks for security cooperation in 
the new era. 122 To meet effectively these new challenges, institutions such as 
NATO and the EU are adapting their policies to include the development of 
programs which are intended to promote economic development. 
120Holst cited in Johan Eriksson, "Security in the Barents Region: 
Interpretations and Implications of the Norwegian Barents Initiative," 
Cooperation and Conflict, val. 30(3), 1995, p. 266. 
121 Holst, "NATO and the Northern Region: Security and Arms Control," 
p. 23. 
1221bid., p. 28. 
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B. THE BARENTS EURO-ARCTIC COUNCIL 
The Barents Cooperation has served as one of the most important 
contributions to the region. Initiated by the Norwegians, the Barents 
Cooperation establishes a meeting place for regional cooperation, not a defined 
program of cooperation. 123 Established in January 1993 with the Kirkenes 
Declaration, the Barents Cooperation identifies seven main areas of 
cooperation: the environment, economic cooperation, science and technology, 
regional infrastructure, indigenous peoples, cultural relations and tourism. 
Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Brundtland sees the Barents Cooperation as "part 
of the general Western ambitions to integrate Russia into binding multilateral 
cooperation with a stable, democratic Europe, and to prevent political, economic 
and social chaos from erupting in its immediate vicinity."124 
The Barents Cooperation is made up of a two-tier organizational system. 
The Barents Euro-Arctic Council, which convenes at the foreign or other minister 
level, is made up of the signers of the Kirkenes Declaration, the Nordic 
countries, Russia, and the European Commission. It is open to all interested 
parties and currently the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the 
USA, Canada, Japan and Italy, all participate as observers. The Regional 
123Holst, The Barents Region: Institutions, Cooperation and Prospects, 
p. 11. 
124Gro Brundtland, Norwegian Prime Minister, Norway and Europe, 
remarks before a luncheon of the European Institute, 18 May, 1994. 
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Council is the supreme body in this cooperation. The council is made up of the 
political leadership of the counties of Finnmark, Trams and Nordland in Norway, 
Norrbotten in Sweden, Lappland in Finland, Murmansk, Archangel and the 
Republic of Karelia in Russia. A representative of the indigenous peoples of the 
region also participates in the council. The Regional Council is not subordinated 
to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. The relationship between the two 
organizations is based on close cooperation between local and central 
authorities in each country. 
Norwegian efforts in the Barents cooperation have clearly defined goals. 
The first is normalization: establishing relations across the boundaries between 
the Nordic countries and Russia. The second is stabilization. This involves a 
wish to promote cooperation and stability through measures to counteract and 
reduce military tension, reduce or eliminate environmental threats, and narrow 
the gap between the standards of living in the region. The final goal, 
regionalization, aims to create a multilateral framework for regional 
cooperation. 125 
The Norwegians view the issue of environmental protection as the most 
important task of the Barents Cooperation. The Russian Northern Fleet, 
industrial pollution, and nuclear activities pose the greatest hazards to the 
region. The rapid development and exploitation of resources in the region 
125Holst, p.12. 
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during the Cold War was accomplished without regard to the environment. The 
Barents Cooperation aims to build programs focusing on reducing industrial 
emissions and radioactive contamination through cooperation between local 
governments. The Regional Council has not been able to accomplish this 
without difficulties. 
The Norwegians see several risks associated with Russian society which 
may present challenges for the Barents Initiative. The instability in Russia, 
which resulted from the collapse of a centralized society and economy, has not 
been readily replaced with a functioning alternative. This lack of control makes 
Western investors skeptical. Anti-Western sentiments in Russia pose another 
problem. Murmansk is a city whose population for the past 70 years has been 
controlled by a central authority, Moscow. The main purpose of Murmansk was 
to support the Northern Fleet. Many inhabitants of Russia deplore the role of 
their state now in relation to the superpower status it held under Soviet rule, and 
this sparks arguments between proponents and opponents of democratization. 
The differences in the cultures of the Norwegians and the Russians must 
also be dealt with. Norwegian and other Western assistance to Russian 
enterprises is often seen as a "capitalist" attempt to exploit them. Since they 
have no experience in a free market system and without control from Moscow, 
they are, for the first time in over 70 years, on their own. Finally, local 
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authorities are preoccupied with regional interests in the process of change in 
Russia. Concern is raised over local relationships with the central authority 
(Moscow) in terms of financial matters. 126 
C. NATO 
Norway sees NATO playing a different security role in the Euro-Arctic 
region than it did during the Cold War. Already the alliance has undergone 
important changes. The emphasis is no longer concentrated solely on defense 
against military threats, but now includes assisting the reform process in the new 
democracies. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for 
Peace are two vehicles that NATO will use in the further development of security 
relations between the Alliance, Russia and the former Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
states. These programs will serve to encourage some partners to adapt their 
military and political system with a view to subsequent NATO membership, and 
as a formal link for those which do not become members of NAT0. 127 
Partnership for Peace (PFP) has provided assistance in the military aspect of 
the reform process. PFP opens the door for the development of close political 
and military ties. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) has 
126Runne Castberg, Olav Stokke, and Willy Ostreng, The Dynamics of the 
Barents Region, in Olav Stokke and Ola Tunander, eds., The Barents Region: 
Cooperation in Arctic Europe (London: SAGE Publications, PRIO, 1994), 
pp. 78-79. 
127Bjorn Tore Godal, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Norway and 
European Perspectives." ODIN, August 29, 1995. 
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J 
concentrated on the civilian aspect of reform including the management of 
pollution resulting form military activities. 128 This is of greatest interest to 
Norway in regards to the Barents Region. 
Norway has chaired a committee, the Committee on the Challenges of 
Modern Society, through NATO/NACC which has already conducted a study on 
cross-border environmental problems emanating from defense-related 
installations and activities. Phase I of the study included comprehensive reports 
on radioactive contamination. Only defense-related sources of radioactive 
contamination affecting three areas, the Barents, Kara and Arctic Seas, the 
Baltic Sea area and the Black Sea area are included. Included in these areas 
were the catchment areas of all rivers that empty into the respective areas. 129 
The findings of the study pinpointed the lack of proper storage facilities and the 
radioactive waste that will be accrued from future submarine decommissioning 
as the main problems facing Russia in the Kola Peninsula. 
The expansion of NATO is an issue about which Norway has already . 
voiced its concerns. Norway is concerned that, if not carried out in a way which 
would reinforce its objectives, a rapid expansion of NATO could result in the 
development of new dividing lines or the resurrection of old ones. 130 It knows full 
1281bid. 
129
"Cross-Border Environmental Problems Emanating From Defense-
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well that any design for a stable Europe must include Russia and that the 
development of relations between NATO and Russia is paramount. Rapid 
NATO expansion would generate Russian opposition if its security concerns 
were not taken into account. Efforts perceived as isolating Russia could lead to 
a new military build-up. Hence, all plans for future developments in European 
security must include a dialogue with Russia. Through PFP, Norway and NATO 
have joined with Russia in a joint naval exercise in the region. The exercise, 
called Pomor, concentrated on training naval forces from the former opposing 
military blocs for peace-keeping operations under the auspices of the United 
Nations. 131 Norwegians are also eager to include Russia in military-style 
exercises comprised of naval rescue exercises at sea and preparations for 
humanitarian actions. 132 
D. THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The European Union (EU) will also play an integral part in Norway's future 
security concerns. Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjorn Tore Godal sees the 
"strengthening of political and economic ties between European countries as the 
best way of creating a more stable political climate, and the European Union has 
131 Johan Eriksson, "Security in the Barents Region: Interpretations and 
Implications of the Norwegian Barents Initiative." Cooperation and Conflict, 
vol.30(3), 1995, p. 273. 
132
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become the key institution for European cooperation. "133 Even though the 
Norwegian referendum in November 1994 voted against joining the European 
Union, Sweden and Finland did join. The "no" vote in November 1994 was the 
second time a referendum on joining the EU had been voted down since Norway 
first rejected membership at the Union's founding in 1957. A fear of Norwegian 
fishing industry coming under severe fishing regulations and the loss of 
subsidies has been a significant contributing factor to the rejection of EU 
membership. 
The accession of Sweden and Finland, the territory of the EU was 
increased by nearly 50 percent and borders directly with Russia. This makes it 
necessary for the EU to take into consideration Northern Europe in its security 
perspectives. 
Planned expansion to the East in assisting the developing democracies of 
the former Soviet Union will add to the stability and prosperity of Europe and 
contribute to the overall security in Europe; and efforts need to be placed on not 
creating new divisions. Norway remains in contact with the EU through 
organizations like the European Economic Area (EEA), Western European 
Union (WEU), and NATO. The benefit of cooperation with the EU is its size and 
vast resources. With the accession of Finland to the EU, Russia has become an 
immediate neighbor of the EU, and the EU is now directly affected by the cross-
133 lbid. 
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border pollution. This will encourage cooperative developments between the 
Barents Initiative and European Union efforts to combine and not duplicate 
efforts. 
E. TACIS 
European Union-Russian cooperation has been built through 
implementation of the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS) program. TACIS was conceived in December 1990 
at a meeting of the European Council. It recognized that the economic reform 
initiatives that the Soviet Union was developing at the time were important in 
promoting peace and stability in Europe and the rest of the world. Many aspects 
of the TACIS program are similar to those of the Barents Cooperation except 
TACIS looks at all of the states of the former Soviet Union whereas the Barents 
Cooperation concentrates on the Barents Region. Through cooperation with the 
EU, Sweden and Finland, Norway will be able to bring attention to the northern 
region and stress the need for economic assistance from the EU through TACIS 
programs. 
TACIS was formally established in July 1991 and is funded from the EU's 
budget and operates under its laws. 134 Since its beginnings in 1991 TACIS has 
strived to provide the know-how to create the means and conditions for 
accelerating the transition to a democratic market society. TACIS has three 
134
"What is Tacis? Partnerships and cooperation with the New 
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main objectives: to support the transition towards the market economy and 
democracy, to develop partnerships and foster links and networks at all levels 
and, to integrate recipient countries into the world economy. 135 
TACIS works with the partner countries to identify priority sectors, which 
are currently: 
-restructuring of state enterprises and private sector development 
-agriculture 
-infrastructure -energy, telecommunications and transport 
-nuclear safety and environment 
-public administration reform 
-social services 
-education 
Environmental and nuclear safety issues are the areas that Norway is the most 
concerned with, and they are an increasing priority in EU/Russian relations. 
TACIS is working to improve the security of the existing reactors and other 
civilian nuclear facilities. TACIS also builds environmental considerations into 
its projects across the range of all priority sectors and provides funding where 
environmental projects are essential to economic reform. 136 Three Environmental 
135
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Centers for Administration and Technology (ECATs) have being or are been 
established in Russia to provide local government and industry with support in 
their efforts to find environmentally sound solutions to problems in their areas. 137 
TACIS funds allocated for projects in 1991 to 1994 totaled ECU 1,757 million. 
ECU 321 million was allocated for nuclear safety and environmental programs. 
F. US SPONSORED PROGRAMS 
The United States Department of Defense's Office of Environmental 
Security has been watching Norway's progress in coping with Arctic Nuclear 
problems ans as a result decided to spend no less than $10 million to study, 
assess, and identify the disposal of nuclear waste by the former Soviet Union in 
the Arctic region. An additional $20 million has been earmarked for this 
research. Efforts have also been devoted to research projects and expeditions 
in the Arctic seas to obtain water, sediment, and biological samples and tests 
for radiological contamination. 138 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is cooperating with former Soviet 
states to jointly conduct research to develop technologies in the areas of 
environmental restoration and waste management. The DOE, however, is not 
authorized to provide direct assistance to help remediate the nuclear waste 
137
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138
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contamination in Russia. DOE and State Department officials say that such aid 
could be very costly given the magnitude of the contamination problems. 139 This 
program is still in its early stages of development. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) both 
provide assistance on establishing regulatory controls over radioactive waste, 
spent fuels and materials, and expanding waste processing facilities. Total 
expenditures by the United States through its various organizations (DOE, DOD, 
EPA, Dept. Of State and NRC) as of March 31, 1995 was $26,87 4,000. 140 
The Environmental Technology Initiative is another effort by the United 
States to aid Russia with its environmental problems. This initiative 
concentrates on exporting American environmental technologies and 
remediation programs and techniques. Emphasis is placed on managing data 
collected from the field. The Russian North-Geographic Information Systems 
Project (RN-GIS) is one such initiative which would be used to establish a 
nation-wide system to catalog, analyze and store data on environmental 
pollution. 141 This system could potentially benefit the Russians in developing a 
program to manage the regions environmental problems before they get worse. 
139lbid.' p. 13. 
1401bid., p. 31. 
141 Robert L. Dunaway, "Environmental Assistance as National Security 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The political, economic and societal changes that encompass Europe 
present the opportunity for stability and peace. Norway has taken this 
opportunity to focus its security policy on issues which until now have been 
overshadowed by the Cold War. 
Norwegian policy makers see their transatlantic ties as indispensable. 
The development over the years of a common set of values encompasses more 
than just security. Democracy, human rights, and economic development all 
lead to the same goal of European security. Norway will still depend on the 
United States as its major supplier of security. However, in the post-Cold War 
world traditional security concerns will be of less concern than before. 
Norway's security concerns in post-Cold War Europe will continue, in 
part, to focus on Russia and its concentration of military assets on the Kola 
Peninsula. In addition, new security policies focusing on broader issues and not 
solely on preparing to repel a Russian invasion will be evident. For Norway, the 
environmental problems in Russia are so far reaching and affect so many 
countries that competition for attention and commitments from other nations will 
arise. 142 Efforts to tackle the environmental problems and to integrate Russia 
into binding multilateral cooperation with a stable Europe, and to prevent 
142Holst, p. 19. 
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political, economic, and social chaos from erupting, will be the primary concern 
of Norway's security agenda. Coordination between the different international 
and bilateral institutions will enhance Norway's position as a Nordic bridge 
between the US, Russia, NATO, and the EU. 
With these efforts, Norway has brought the issue of environmental 
degradation as a national security issue to the forefront. A primary goal of 
Norwegian policy is to help find a common solution to the world's ecological and 
resource problems. 143 Norway is accomplishing this by adapting the same 
institutions it used for defense security during the Cold War and using them as 
building blocks for programs to attack the environmental problems. 
Disasters in the area of environmental security in the northern region 
could be one of the first of many non-military issues to test the effectiveness of 
the Atlantic Alliance in the northern region in the post-Cold War era. The 
effectiveness of institutions like NATO, the EU, and the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council will determine whether or not programs to deal with such non-military 
security threats will be successful in the future 
Ecological threats are do not respect political boundaries. They require 
efforts to solutions that transcend boundaries, and international cooperation is 
143Nytt fra Norge, "Questions regarding Norwegian Foreign Policy," ODIN, 
September 1995. 
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the apparent order of the day."144 While present environmental problems are of 
concern, it is the future threats to the environment which is where the emphasis 
needs to be placed. As the protective containers and metal skins of these 
Russian reactors and barrels begin to corrode, they will spew their contents into 
the ocean. The feasibility of removing the reactors has been looked into, 
however, there is a chance that damage to a unit while trying to retrieve it could 
cause a leak or, worst case, cause a nuclear chain reaction. Efforts will need to 
be placed on sealing the already sunken units but, technology has not reached a 
point where there is the ability accomplish this and have it last for thousands of 
years. Likewise, the upgrading and repairs to existing storage facilities must be 
emphasized. Russia continues to generate radioactive waste without the 
storage facilities to accommodate it. A nuclear incident on land can have more 
immediate effects than one in the ocean. Permanent monitoring is required in 
order to detect any release of radioactivity at an early stage so that emergency 
measures can be implemented. 145 
The potential for civilian social unrest with the problems is gaining 
momentum as rumors about dumping, inadequate storage facilities, and hazards 
circulate faster than the actual verification of the situation. During the Soviet 
144Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-
Cold War Security Discourse," Alternatives, vol.17, 1992, p. 115. 
145 Johan Jorgen Holst, The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe 
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era, government officials categorically denied dumping hazardous waste and 
did not reveal the actual health and environmental threats the dumping could 
pose in the future hence, the public was not fully aware of the situation. Now 
that the public is more informed, they want action taken. 
Once Russia accepts the responsibility for its past actions and makes a 
determined effort to make corrections, then the organizations which have offered 
their assistance, financial and technical, will be able to move forward. Working 
to ease the tensions and possibility of political conflict between Norway and 
Russia and ultimately preventing any future damage to the people of the region 
and the Arctic's fragile environment should be the goal. However, when the 
Russians continue to spend enormous amounts of money on operating a nuclear 
fleet and building new nuclear vessels, and then turn around and say that there 
is no funding available for building storage units and processing facilities, their 
credibility is questioned. There are still remains great strides to be taken in the 
area of environmental security in the northern region and it will ultimately require 
international cooperation to dispose of this threat. 
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